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Destruction and the philosophy of desire 
 
Vincenzo Ruggiero 
Middlesex University, London (UK) 
 
Looking at green criminology from the perspective of neoliberal 
economics can add some elements to this growing area of enquiry. 
Complementing economic reasoning with references to what I 
describe as the philosophy of desire can compound arguments 
against environmental destruction. This chapter attempts both 
enterprises.    
 
The abysmal science 
 
We spend money we don’t have, on things we don’t need, to make 
impressions that don’t last, on people who don’t care. Because we do 
not pursue what is necessary, but what is superfluous, neoliberal 
economic thought needs to turn the superfluous into a natural 
product of human activity or even into an element of human organic 
reproduction. Hence its need to imitate the natural sciences. 
Biologists, physicists, mathematicians and other scientists have been 
called upon to make economic theories more ‘realistic and effective’, 
namely to inoculate doses of dogma into them. The major opus of 
economics produced in the 20th century, the General Theory of 
Keynes (1936), out of a total 400 pages included, mainly in the 
appendix, three or four simple equations. In 1950 only in 2-3 per cent 
of the articles published by the influential American Economic Review 
contained mathematic formulas, which normally were not at all 
sophisticated.  In 1980 the papers with mathematical calculations 
were 44 per cent and formulas had become much more complex. 
Currently the percentage is close to 90 per cent. The only ‘real’ 
science within the human sciences, this increasingly esoteric 
discipline, in its neoliberal version, dominates in university courses, 
in the specialist literature, and in most schools of management and 
business. It is the core religion of business administrators, large 
enterprises, financial institutions, ministries of the economy, central 
banks, international organizations, the World Bank, the World 
Monetary Fund and the European Commission.  
 
‘The economy is seen as a physical system, implying flows of 
goods, information and energy, so that it might be useful to 
model the economy as a system, like physics does. However, 
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while economic theory uses the concept of equilibrium, the 
same concept used by physics cannot be applied to the 
economy, because this is an open system and equilibrium 
refers to closed systems’ (Gallino, 2011: 92). 
 
   Neo-liberalism does not observe and describe the economic reality, 
it creates this reality (Ruggiero, 2013). It also contradicts one of the 
very axioms of free markets, namely that the full costs of a 
transaction must be borne by the involved parties. Many economic 
activities and transactions, however, exact a significant price on 
humans and ecosystems, although economists label such price with 
the reassuring euphemism ‘externalities’. In brief, neo-liberalism 
regards environmental harm as an accidental, unintentional, 
externality. 
   Applying the meum-tuum distinction suggested by Hayek (1973), 
we can formulate the following question: Is the environment a public 
good? The answer is ‘Yes’, if we, in abstract terms, assimilate it to 
other non-rival, non-excludable goods, in the sense that one person’s 
enjoyment of the environment does not exclude its enjoyment by 
others, and in the sense that the good environment is provided to one 
and all at the same time. However, the answer is ‘No’ if we believe 
that goods and resources belong to those who turn them into wealth. 
Neoliberalism embraces the latter assumption, thus reiterating early 
liberalist notions according to which the earth has to be turned into 
property through manipulation, improvement and work. By leaving 
fruits to rot and venison to putrefy, and for that matter by leaving the 
earth untouched, we offend the common law of nature (Ruggiero, 
2013). With neoliberalism, the entire world is given to those who are 
more capable of exploiting it, and the environment, therefore, is both 
meum and tuum, provided we both know how to extract value out of 
it. The boundaries, in this case, are not determined by the 
identification of objects upon which the different individuals exercise 
control, but merely by their capacity and ingenuity, which constitute 
the only limit to initiative and development. The ultimate resource, in 
brief, is the human mind, and throughout history human genius 
always wins out against natural resource restraints.  
   The harm caused by economic initiative, therefore, amounts to 
‘externality’. This includes climate change, disposal of toxic waste, de-
forestation, pollution of sea, air and land, gigantic disparities in 
income, transference of toxicity to poor regions and countries, 
impoverishment of vulnerable populations and destruction of 
communities (White, 2010; South and Brisman, 2013). These 
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‘ecocidal’ tendencies (South, 2010) implicit in unfettered 
development are masked in a process whereby the specific victims of 
development itself disappear. Ideological strategies preside over this 
disappearance, among which a hierarchical positioning of 
populations and individuals is of crucial importance. Ontological 
priorities are established so that some lives are deemed less valuable 
than others: in fact, some lives are never lived nor lost in the full 
sense. There are lives worth living and lives worth destroying, the 
former being valuable and grievable, the latter devalued and 
ungrievable (Butler, 2009). Utilitarian reasoning does not object to 
such distinction, as the suffering of some does not diminish the total 
happiness generated by the economy. This distinction, in other 
words, implies the neglect of individual wellbeing and happiness, 
while the ranking of social goodness and the selection of what is to be 
chosen are done simply on the basis of the sum total of individual 
welfares (Sen, 2009). 
 
‘The utilitarian calculus based on happiness or desire-
fulfillment can be deeply unfair to those who are persistently 
deprived since our mental make-up and desires tend to adjust 
to circumstances, particularly to make life bearable in adverse 
situations. It is through “coming to terms” with one’s hopeless 
predicament that life is made somewhat bearable by the 
traditional underdogs, such as oppressed minorities in 
intolerant communities, sweated workers in exploitative 
industrial arrangements, precarious share-croppers living in a 
world of uncertainty, or subdued housewives in deeply sexist 
cultures’ (ibid: 282).  
 
This ‘coming to terms’ includes the acceptance of differentiated 
distribution of vulnerability and precariousness that neoliberal 
economy promotes.  
 
Habit and domination 
 
Social scientists who intend to critique the economic logic do not 
have to go far, in that a return to classical texts may provide enough 
food for thought. Max Weber argues that markets are antithetic to all 
other communities, because the latter, not the former, presuppose 
‘brotherhood’ among people. But let us expand on Weber’s thought.  
   In trade, the guarantee of legality on the part of two individuals 
involved is based on the presupposition, often shared by both, that 
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each of them will have an interest in continuing the exchange in the 
future, and that therefore will respect the pacts and the promise 
given. But because trade is a form of socialization with strangers, 
therefore with enemies, at the origin, the supervision of legality was 
entrusted to the religious authority, under the tutelage of the temple, 
which with time became the state. Supervising over legality, 
however, does not guarantee the rationality of economic initiative, 
which by pursuing maximum profitability is constantly urged to 
cross the boundaries of legality itself. There is, therefore, an element 
of substantive irrationality in the economic order, determined by 
attempts to make short-term speculative profit, described by Weber 
as ‘pure gambling interest’, which ‘is one of the sources of the 
phenomena known as the “crises” of the modern market economy’ 
(Weber, 1978: 40). 
   Weber adds that humans are creatures of habit, but they are also 
strongly motivated by their material and ideal interests to 
circumvent conventional and legal rules, and ‘in all societies the 
economically powerful tend to have a strong influence on the 
enactment and interpretation of the law’ (Roth, 1978: lxix). For this 
reason, Weber’s work on economic issues is in a sense a sociology of 
domination, in which the gradual usurpation of collective power 
results in legitimate institutional force.  
   Following a Weberian classification, power implies the use or threat 
of coercive force on those who are given orders, whereas domination 
is to be understood as legitimized, internalized propensity to obey 
orders (Ruggiero, 2015). This also applies to the economic sphere. 
   Legitimacy, however, though internalized, needs constant 
justification on the part of those who have authority, wealth and 
honour to give reason for their good fortune. Economic thought 
offers such constant justification.  
   Ultimately, what prevails in Weber’s examination of economic 
activity is a sense that such activity follows a goal-oriented 
rationality which is mainly ‘traditional’ in its orientation. ‘Even in 
cases where there is a high degree of rationalization of action, the 
element of traditional orientation remains considerable’ (Weber 
1978: 69). It is against this tradition that the next section of this 
chapter will now turn.  
 
Poverty as the trigger of development 
 
Practitioners of economics are not allowed friendliness, they are 
required to describe human motivations as pure and simple, and 
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keep their economic models devoid of such things as goodwill and 
moral sentiments. It is extraordinary that economic thought has 
evolved in this way, describing human goals in such spectacularly 
narrow terms, also because ‘economics is largely an offshoot of 
ethics’ (Sen, 1987: 1-2). Individuals may well understand and wish to 
maximize their interest, but practical morality should perhaps lead 
them to the recognition that theirs and other people’s interest are 
interdependent. ‘The recognition of interdependence may suggest 
following certain rules of behaviour, which are not necessarily of 
intrinsic value, but which are of great instrumental importance in the 
enhancement of the respective goals of the members of a group’ 
(ibid: 85). Many economic schools of thought fail to recognize this 
interdependence, although they attempt to persuade us (along with 
Adam Smith) that the interests of the butchers are linked with those 
of their costumers. We have to infer that the values of economics are 
found in economics itself and accept, for example, a notion of justice 
as inequality, because inequality supposedly encourages the 
disadvantaged to follow in the footsteps of their role models, namely 
the privileged. The reality is that the example set by the privileged 
does not indicate how to create wealth, but how to take it from 
others. If not acquisitive crime, this gives rise to instability, and the 
latter to social harm, and the irony is ‘that while inequality givers rise 
to instability, the instability itself gives rise to more inequality’ 
(Stiglitz, 2012: 91). 
   It is inequality itself, its explanation and rationalization, which have 
mobilized the most ingenious talents in the economics profession.  
 
‘In nearly all economic history most people have been poor and 
a comparative few have been very rich. Accordingly, there has 
been a compelling need to explain why this is so – and, alas, on 
frequent occasion, to tell why it should be so’ (Galbraith, 1987: 
2-3). 
 
Poverty as the result of divine displeasure was turned by economists 
into inequality as the trigger of development and happiness, and 
while political economy merged with theology, existing social 
relations were sanctified. As Thomas More (1997: 127) argued 
centuries ago, one can perceive a ‘conspiracy’ on the part of the 
wealthy, who through devices and ‘all means and crafts’, try to ‘keep 
safely without fear of losing what they have unjustly gathered 
together’. These devices are then turned into laws, whereby the only 
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legitimate thing the non-wealthy can do is endeavour to imitating the 
wealthy. 
   That such an endeavour is implausible is proven by another core 
notion we find in economic thought, where freedom and equality are 
deemed irreconcilable. Economics posits that distribution of 
resources is spontaneous, neutral, market-driven. Following the 
examples of the privileged, therefore, will only generate acquiescence 
for a system allowing the privileges openly displayed to remain 
accessible to a few. If left alone, markets will produce, so we are told, 
the most efficient and just outcome. This self-serving notion, in fact, 
justifies a mere upward redistribution of income, and making rich 
people richer does not make everyone else richer. In brief, wealth 
trickles up. Moreover, the very ‘trickle-down’ metaphor does not 
refer to a gushing waterfall or a potent flow, but to a mere leaking 
tap.   
   Economic thought is, indeed, framed in metaphorical terms, 
nevertheless it constrains our lives, and by virtue of what it hides, 
can lead to the acceptance of human and environmental degradation. 
I call this degradation and the social harms thus produced ‘the crimes 
of the economy’, which affect workers, consumers, creditors, 
investors and taxpayers, and of course the environment. Such victims 
undergo a process of disappearance set off by specific ideological 
strategies. There are numerous ways of rationalizing the crimes of 
the economy, the first being the mobilization of the variable 
externalities, as already remarked. These crimes are often 
downplayed to the rank of unwanted effect of industrial production 
or commercial transaction. This is to say, whoever suffers the 
consequences of an economic operation in which he/she does not 
take part is the victim of unintentional actions: he or she is an 
‘externality’.  
    
 Enough is enough 
   
Economic history is not a noble history: habit and tradition, as 
indicated by Weber, urge human action into limitless development 
and growth, irrespective of consequences. Some economic conducts 
seem hardly susceptible to the control and discipline of legal norms. 
If we adhere to Weber’s point of view in a more comprehensive way, 
we have to conclude that development itself, and the growing 
complexity of markets, make legal coercion increasingly difficult to 
apply to the economic sphere. As a logical consequence, we may 
advocate a halt to economic development as the only way of reducing 
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and preventing the crimes of the economy. Arguments against 
insatiability might be put forward as a challenge against the current 
obsession with growth: ‘enough is enough’. ‘To say that my aim in life 
is to make more and more money is like saying that my aim in eating 
is to get fatter and fatter’ (Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012: 5).  
   The prosperity of a country cannot be narrowly measured through 
the amount of money available for a given number of individuals, but 
also and primarily depends on how resources are distributed, how 
people live, their degree of participation in the civic and political 
arena, their capacity to function, make choices and control their 
outcomes. 
   Against insatiability, the notion of ‘de-growth’ can be mobilized, as 
infinite growth is not only a metaphor for unpleasant and unhealthy 
obesity, but also because it is criminogenic: it depicts greed and 
acquisitiveness in a positive light, making them core values of 
individual and collective behaviour (Latouche, 2008; 2010). 
Simultaneously, growth as we have experienced it over the decades 
exacerbates the polarization of wealth, therefore increasing relative 
deprivation, one of the central variables in the analysis of crime. 
Ultimately, as a manifestation of insatiability, growth is a form of 
pathology, like the uncontrollable, neurotic desire to collect things or 
to swallow enormous quantities of food. Economists cannot keep 
preaching that such manifestations of neurosis signal healthy 
collective conditions.  
   Challenging growth implies a distinction between needs and wants, 
the former being characterized by an absolute and the latter by a 
relative nature. We feel the importance of the former whatever the 
condition of our fellow human beings may be, while we pursue the 
latter in order to feel superior to our fellows (Keynes, 1972). Wants 
are infinite and are lured towards both ‘bandwagon goods’, which are 
desired because others possess them, and ‘snob goods’, which are 
desired because others do not possess them (Veblen, 1924). The 
latter are mere advertisements of wealth, status consumptions which 
legitimize permanent growth and constant deviations from the rules 
officially governing it. Growth satisfies both types of wants while 
creating new ones, it is like a Faustian Man, ambitious, omnivorous, 
perpetually driven beyond the limits, the infinite, in a vortex that 
brings ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, namely what I term the crimes of the 
economy. 
 
Desire of nothing 
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In the second and final part if this chapter I would like to connect 
these ideas we find in the economic sphere to more general concepts 
that I group under the definition ‘the philosophy of desire’. Here, we 
shall see how green criminology has to struggle not only against the 
logic of markets, but also against a powerful set of notions that 
belong to our own Western philosophical tradition.  
   The concept of being is often liked to an idea of ‘lacking’, referred to 
a deficit, something we will never attain. To be means to feel a 
possibility, to reach something that is not there yet, that has not yet 
become, or will never become real. This notion of being contains 
ideas revolving around the human uncertainty about the future. 
Lacan (2014) offers a powerful analysis of this uncertainty, when he 
describes the subject as ‘nobody’, being fragmented and decomposed. 
Thus, human subjects are characterized by a ‘void’, that they attempt 
to fill with dynamic responses in form of desires, although desires 
often fail to address precise objects. Humans are not satisfied by the 
attainment of a thing, an object, a value item and so on. Therefore, 
desires never nullify or fill a void: once humans identify an object of 
desire, and even when they gain possession of that object, their 
desires grow, move on, turning into desire of nothing. In sum, lack 
and want are inherent in the human condition. The infinite pursuit of 
nothing, in its turn, makes the identification of reference points 
necessary: we need stability and only idols can provide it to us 
(Ruggiero, 2017). Economic growth is one such idol. 
   On the other hand, humans are aware that they are finite and 
mortal: we are lucid about this, and as a consequence, we have a 
special relationship with temporality. This is why we tend to 
measure, calculate, as a way of assessing what we have done in the 
past and what we plan to do in the future. Calculate, plan, build, 
construct, produce, but also optimize: all of these are carried out with 
the urgency dictated by our awareness of time and mortality. 
   To reiterate, one of the possibilities for humans is to identify idols, 
phantom entities as point of reference, as carriers of stability in a 
condition otherwise characterized by constant anxiety. But how can 
this be done, if desire is infinite? Instead of trying to possess things, 
humans may choose to be possessed by them: they become, in this 
way, prisoners of the things they want, so that anxiety and 
uncertainty may cease. We then become totally alienated: we 
dissolve ourselves in the objects we desire, we become objects and 
things ourselves. Humans, ultimately, can choose to assert 
themselves as slaves rather than as subjects.  
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   The idolatry of infinite development causes destruction while 
encouraging consumption, which has nothing to do with need or 
even less with desire. Markets, in fact, possess a specific capacity, 
that of attributing human anxiety to the lack of something they can 
provide. You are anxious because you need this, and here it is, I can 
give it to you. This is the answer to your restlessness. Commodities, 
in this sense have a metaphysical subtlety and a theological 
character, they are independent entities, acquiring their own life. Of 
course, we find these suggestions in Marx, although in classical 
literature we may find even more powerful renditions of them.  
   When Balzac’s Père Goriot is dying, his daughter attends a 
sumptuous ball, which she prioritizes over tending her father in his 
death bed. The ball is a display of wealth, luxury and status, and the 
things in view seem to take on their own independent life (Balzac, 
1966). The lamps light out the Hotel de Beauseant, a gendarme in all 
the glory of his uniform stands on either side of the resplendent 
gateway, while the great world flocks in. The attire of the most 
beautiful women in Paris is dazzling, while the most distinguished 
men proudly deploy their decorations, stars and ribbons, as if 
showing less their military honour than their bank account. The 
music of the orchestra vibrates and the waves of notes confer more 
splendor to the golden ceiling of the palace. It is a society adorning 
itself with things that speak, move and dance by themselves. In that 
ball we can see not only a ghostly dance that repels the ‘spectre 
haunting Europe’, but also an assemblage of commodities endowed 
with invincible force and frightening power. Lamps and golden 
ceilings are not just things, and their properties do not merely 
respond to human needs. They are on a stage as commodities, 
symbolic entities acting and interacting among one another, 
presenting themselves as marked by their specific market value 
(Ruggiero, 2015). The ball is a coup de theatre, in which the ordinary 
is transfigured and metamorphosed into a supernatural thing. 
Commodities assume ghostly silhouettes, invade the stage with their 
spectral moves, come alive and address other commodities, their 
ghostly fellows (Derrida, 2006). In brief, Balzac’s characters prefigure 
the insatiability of consumerism (Eagleton, 2009).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Neoliberalism posits this type of insatiability. It attempts to 
transform subjects as we know them in specific social contexts into 
universal beings, unchanged by circumstances and unchangeable by 
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political events. These universal beings are required to produce not 
something they need to use, but something they need to destroy, as 
enjoyment of a commodity is less important than its death. As 
Baudrillard (2005) put it, production survives and continues only 
because of this massacre: things have to become obsolete, their use-
value has to diminish, otherwise the process as a whole comes to a 
halt. Green criminology cannot avoid addressing these destructive 
effects of production and economic growth.  
   Destruction is fed by a mimetic mechanism, as we have seen: we 
want what other people have, but then we also want what other 
people do not have. And this mimetic behaviour is justified by 
neoliberalism, which also preaches increasing social inequality, as 
the deprived can look to the advantaged and find their role model in 
them. The advantaged, in this way, become ideals or indeed idols to 
which all are expected to conform their conduct and activity.  
   This mechanism was clear in the mind of Saint Thomas, who argued 
that we are sad when faced with the wellbeing of others because we 
regard it as the cause of our own humiliation. Sadness, impotence 
and failure: these are all associated with dissatisfaction, and as a 
consequence they are experienced as reasons for compensation if not 
revenge. Inequality and consumerism foster envy. The subject does 
not consume, he/she is consumed. 
   To conclude, green criminology may find inspiration and novel 
impetus from the radical critique of economic thought and a 
dissection of the philosophy of desire. These are epitomized by the 
motto ‘the car is war’, with which Walter Benjamin (2011: 167) 
meant that our societies develop technical means without being able 
to control them morally. The destructive impetus of neoliberal 
doctrines reveals the ruinous ‘discrepancy between the enormous 
efforts of technology and its miserable moral illumination’ (ibid). 
This moral void echoes the legendary figure of Mephistopheles, who 
pursues evil while producing good, who follows his vices claiming 
that they will turn into public virtues, who is guided by egoistic 
desires but claims to cause collective benefit. In his radical critique of 
‘development’, Benjamin (ibid: 309) looks at a painting by Klee called 
Angelus Novus, in which an angel walks away from something she 
stares at. Her eyes are wide open, her mouth is gaping, her wings are 
spread out. The angel of history must possess similar traits: where 
we see a chain of events she sees total catastrophe, an accumulation 
of debris upon debris. The angel would like to fly into the past, 
attempt to awaken the dead and mend the damage caused. But from 
heaven a storm blows that pushes her towards the future, while the 
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heap of ruins grows in front of her. ‘What we call progress is this 
storm’. 
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